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RILEY V. CALIFORNIA: THE NEW KATZ OR CHIMEL?
Adam Lamparello & Charles MacLean
“To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely
set its face.”1
Cite as: Adam Lamparello & Charles MacLean, Riley v. California: The
New Katz or Chimel?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i1/article1.pdf.
I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
In Olmstead v. United States, 2 Justice Louis Brandeis dissented
from a 5–4 ruling that allowed law enforcement officers to obtain private
wiretapped telephone conversations without a warrant and use them as
evidence. 3 Justice Brandeis’ words foreshadowed the threats to civil
liberties that technology would pose:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences


Assistant Professors of Law, Indiana Tech Law School.

1

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
2

Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438.

3

See id. at 466.
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of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences
may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs,
thoughts and emotions. “That places the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer” was said by James
Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To Lord
Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed “subversive of all
the comforts of society.” Can it be that the Constitution
affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?4
[2]
Over three-quarters of a century later, privacy is being attacked in
a manner that threatens the liberty of every citizen. The Government is
tracking the whereabouts of its citizens at any time of the day, 5 recording
Internet search history6 and data stored on a hard drive,7 and monitoring
messages sent by text message or e-mail.8 As a result, some individuals
may unknowingly be on a terror watch list for downloading a video that
depicts Al Qaeda sympathizers burning an American flag and threatening
an attack larger than September 11, 2001, when hijacked planes toppled

4

Id. at 474.

5

See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing the
information involved in metadata collection).
6

See Glen Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA tool collection ‘nearly everything a user does on
the internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y847-C3Q7.
7

See Jason Mick, Tax and Spy: How the NSA Can Hack Any American, Stores Data 15
Years, DAILY TECH (Dec. 31, 2013, 12:36 PM),
http://www.dailytech.com/Former+FBI+Agent+All+Your+Communications+are+Record
ed+Government+Accessible/article31486.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ZWZ4-STDD.
8

See Adam Weinstein, The Government’s Phone, Text, and Email Spying, Explained,
FUSION (Oct. 25, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://fusion.net/abc_univision/story/governmentsphone-text-email-spying-explained-22515, archived at http://perma.cc/VCC2-CPHP.
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New York City’s twin towers and took the lives of over 3000 people.9
The most frightening aspect is that the Government is doing all of this
without a warrant. In some cases, the Government has no suspicion
whatsoever.10 In every case, the Fourth Amendment rights of its citizens
are being violated.
[3]
For these and other reasons, Riley v. California, 11 where the
Supreme Court unanimously held that warrantless searches of a cell phone
incident to arrest were unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth
Amendment,12 came at the right time. As discussed below, Riley marks a
new era of privacy protection that does not yield in the face of the broad,
McCarthy-esque justifications of “national security” and the “war on
terror.” Instead, the Court recognized that “protection against such
invasions of individual security”13 supports the conclusion that pre-digital
era case law could neither foresee nor protect against these invasions.
[4]
The Court’s decision suggests that cellular telephones, particularly
smartphones, along with laptop computers and other digital devices, are
the twenty-first century’s private ‘homes,’ where individuals store the
“papers and affects” traditionally accorded Fourth Amendment protection.
The unanswered question, however, is whether Riley is the beginning of a
principled, Katz-driven jurisprudence that focuses on privacy protection14
9

See Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, The Secret Government Rulebook for Labeling
You a Terrorist, THE INTERCEPT (July 23, 2014, 2:45 PM),
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/0/23/blacklisted/, archived at
http://perma.cc/4FPY-A344; see also Watchlisting Guidance, U.S. NAT’L
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (Mar. 2013) (detailing government qualifications for
putting people on a terrorist watchlist).
10

See Scahill & Devereaux, supra note 9.

11

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

12

See id. at 2493.

13

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–74.

14

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (focusing on an individual’s
right to be left alone rather than determining what geographic areas are constitutionally
protected).
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or a muddled jurisprudence that immerses itself in the many hypertechnicalities that characterized the post-Chimel era.15 This essay argues
that Riley is the new Katz, and marks the beginning of increased
protections for privacy in the digital age.
II. THE NEW KATZ: PRIVACY FOR THE DIGITAL AGE
[5]
In Riley, the Court held that the original justifications for
warrantless searches incident to arrest under Chimel—officer safety and
the preservation of evidence—were not implicated in cell phone
searches.16 Writing for a unanimous court,17 Justice Roberts correctly held

15

See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1967); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 342 (2009 ); New York v. Belton; and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973) (highlighting the hyper-technicalities that characterized this post Chimel
world). In Chimel, the Court created the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, which allows
warrantless searches of an arrestee’s person to protect officer safety and preserve
evidence:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. . . . There is ample
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area
“within his immediate control”—construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.
Chimel, at 762-63.
In the years following Chimel, the Court expanded Chimel to allow virtually all
warrantless searches incident to arrest, even if safety and evidence preservation were not
implicated. See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (1981) (expanding Chimel to hold that law
enforcement officers may search the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle).
16

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85.

17

Id. at 2480.
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that cell phones could not be used as weapons18 and that the likelihood of
evidence destruction was remote. 19 Thus, absent exigent circumstances
law enforcement could not search an arrestee’s cell phone without a
warrant and probable cause. 20 Several aspects of the Court’s opinion
suggested that the Government’s days of relying on case law from an era
of rotary telephones, eight-track tapes, and crumpled cigarette packs is
over.21 Specifically, in distinguishing cell phones from physical objects
such as plastic containers, wallets, and address books, the Court
recognized that “[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s
person.”22
A. The Quantity of Information in Cell Phones
[6]
Justice Roberts’ opinion recognized that cellular phones,
particularly smartphones, are not really “phones” in a traditional sense.23
Justice Roberts wrote:
The term “cell phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many
of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen
to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could
just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes,
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums,
televisions, maps, or newspapers.24

18

See id. at 2485.

19

See id. at 2486–87.

20

See id. at 2493.

21

See Riley 134 S. Ct. at 2485, 2488–89.

22

Id. at 2489.

23

See id.

24

Id.
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[7]
Furthermore, cell phones can hold “millions of pages of text,
thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos [and] . . . [e]ven the most
basic phones that sell for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture
messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, [and] a
thousand-entry phone book.”25
[8]
Additionally, a cell phone “collects in one place many distinct
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement,
a video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated
record.” 26 As Justice Roberts explained, this information implicates
privacy in a manner that physical objects do not:
[A] cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of
information to convey far more than previously possible.
The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates,
locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a
photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.
Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of
the phone, or even earlier. A person might carry in his
pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he
would not carry a record of all his communications with
Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely
be kept on a phone.27
Justice Roberts also emphasized the “element of pervasiveness that
characterizes cell phones but not physical records, [holding that] . . .
[p]rior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive

25

Id.

26

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.

27

Id.
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personal information with them as they went about their day.” 28
Comparing cell phones to physical objects was “like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both
are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies
lumping them together.”29
B. The Quality of Information in a Cell Phone
[9]
Most importantly, the Court held that cell phones store uniquely
private information.30 For example, “Internet search and browsing history
. . . can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an
individual's private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain
symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.” 31 In
addition, “application software on a cell phone, or ‘apps,ʼ offer a range of
tools for managing detailed information about all aspects of a person's
life.” 32 In fact, quoting Learned Hand, Justice Roberts held that the
quantity and quality of private information stored on a cell phone is even
greater than that stored in a home:
In 1926, Learned Hand observed . . . that it is “a totally
different thing to search a man’s pockets and use against
him what they contain, from ransacking his house for
everything which may incriminate him.” If his pockets
contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true.
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a
house: A phone not only contains in digital form many
28

Id. at 2490 (“It is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American
adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect
of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”).
29

Id. at 2488.

30

Id. at 2473.

31

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.

32

Id.
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sensitive records previously found in the home; it also
contains a broad array of private information never found
in a home in any form—unless the phone is.33
[10] Furthermore, through the use of cloud computing, some of “the
data a user views on many modern cell phones may not in fact be stored
on the device itself . . . [due to] the capacity of Internet-connected devices
to display data stored on remote servers.”34
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RILEY AND ITS APPLICATION TO OTHER
CASES
[11] Riley is a landmark decision and marks the beginning of the end of
the Government’s intrusion into the private digital lives of its citizens.
A. Pre-Digital Case Law is Easily Distinguishable and
Therefore No Longer Controls
[12] The Court recognized that pre-digital era case law could not be
applied to digital-era problems. 35
First, Justice Roberts found
unpersuasive the Government’s reliance on United States v. Robinson,
where the Court upheld, under Chimel, the warrantless search of a
crumpled up cigarette pack. 36 The Court’s decision in Robinson
significantly expanded Chimel by holding that “custodial arrest of a
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification.” 37 Thus, under Robinson it did not
33

Id. at 2490–91 (quoting United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir.
1926)).
34

Id. at 2491.

35

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, 2494.

36

See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973).

37

Id. at 235.
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matter whether the original justifications under Chimel—officer safety or
evidence preservation—were implicated.38 The Riley Court rejected the
reasoning in Robinson and, although the Court did not directly overturn
Robinson’s holding that Chimel’s dual objectives “are present in all
custodial arrests,” it found that there “are no comparable risks when the
search is of digital data.”39
[13] Additionally, although the Robinson Court “regarded any privacy
interests retained by an individual after arrest as significantly diminished
by the fact of the arrest itself,” the same could not be said in the cell phone
context. 40 Indeed, cell phones “place vast quantities of personal
information literally in the hands of individuals,” a search of which “bears
little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in
Robinson.”41 Furthermore, “[t]he possibility that a search might extend
well beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee is
yet another reason that the privacy interests here dwarf those in
Robinson.”42 Put differently, depending on the privacy interests at stake,
“[n]ot every search ‘is acceptable solely because a person is in
custody.’”43
[14] The Court also rejected the Government’s reliance on Arizona v.
Gant, 44 which “added . . . an independent exception for a warrantless
search of a vehicle's passenger compartment ‘when it is reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.”’45 Importantly, however, Gant relied on “circumstances unique
38

See id. at 235.

39

Riley, 134 at 2484–85.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 2485.

42

Id.at 2491.

43

Id. at 2488 (quoting Maryland v. King 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013)).

44

See id. at 2492.

45

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
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to the vehicle context” to endorse a search solely for the purpose of
gathering evidence.46 Relying on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Thornton v. United States, 47 Justice Roberts explained that the unique
circumstances in Gant are “ʻa reduced expectation of privacyʼ and
‘heightened law enforcement needs’ when it comes to motor vehicles.”48
Searches of cell phones, however, “bear neither of those characteristics.”49
[15] Most importantly, Justice Roberts recognized that the standard
adopted in Gant “would prove no practical limit at all when it comes
to cell phone searches,”50 stating as follows:
In the vehicle context, Gant generally protects against
searches for evidence of past crimes.
In
the cell phone context, however, it is reasonable to expect
that incriminating information will be found on a phone
regardless of when the crime occurred. Similarly, in the
vehicle context Gant restricts broad searches resulting from
minor crimes such as traffic violations. That would not
necessarily be true for cell phones.
It would be a
particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law
enforcement officer who could not come up with several
reasons to suppose evidence of just about any crime could
be found on a cell phone. Even an individual pulled over
for something as basic as speeding might well have
locational data dispositive of guilt on his phone. An
individual pulled over for reckless driving might have
evidence on the phone that shows whether he was texting
while driving.
The sources of potential pertinent
46

Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.

47

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628–32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).

48

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631).

49

Id. at 2492.

50

Id.
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information are virtually unlimited, so applying
the Gant standard to cell phones would in effect give
“police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will
among a person's private effects.”51
The Court also rejected the Government’s reliance on Smith v.
Maryland, 52 which upheld the use of pen registers to monitor outgoing
calls from a suspect’s private residence.53 In doing so, the Court rejected
the Government’s argument that searches can be limited to call logs, as
they “typically contain more than just phone numbers; they include any
identifying information that an individual might add.”54 Finally, the Court
refused to permit searches of cell phone data “if [law enforcement] could
have obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.”55 In
fact, Justice Roberts made it a point to distance the Court from applying
pre-digital era case law to digital age technology:
[T]he fact that a search in the pre-digital era could have
turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a
search of thousands of photos in a digital gallery. The fact
that someone could have tucked a paper bank statement in a
pocket does not justify a search of every bank statement
from the last five years. And to make matters worse, such
an analogue test would allow law enforcement to search a
range of items contained on a phone, even though people
would be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in
physical form.56

51

Id. (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 345).

52

See id., 134 S. Ct. at 2492–93.

53

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 at 745–46 (1979).

54

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492–93.

55

Id. at 2493.

56

Id.
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[16] Indeed, “a significant diminution of privacy” would result if law
enforcement could search all areas of a cell phone merely to locate
information that could be stored in a pre-digital era physical object. 57
Furthermore, the Government’s argument that law enforcement could
“‘develop protocols to address’ concerns raised by cloud computing,” was
unpersuasive because “the Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the
right to government agency protocols.”58 They fought to ensure that the
Government could not run roughshod over the privacy rights of its
citizens—even if its citizens might be safer as a result.
[17] Ultimately, Justice Roberts’ opinion suggests that the Government
will now be required to provide a digital-era justification to search the
“papers and effects” that are stored in cell phones. 59 At the heart of
Justice Roberts’ opinion was a desire to prevent law enforcement from
conducting the types of broad, non-particularized searches, which was
“one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself,” and led the
Founders to adopt the Fourth Amendment. 60 Indeed, “the Fourth
Amendment was the founding generation's response to the reviled ‘general
warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed
British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for
evidence of criminal activity.”61
B. Rejecting an Ad Hoc, Case-By-Case Jurisprudence
[18] In a noticeable departure from its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court emphasized the importance of creating bright-line
rules to govern searches of private cell phone data. 62 Justice Roberts
57

Id.

58

Id. at 2491.

59

Id. at 2493.

60

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.

61

Id.

62

See id. at 2491–92.
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wrote that “if police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the
competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a categorical
basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police
officers.’” 63 Otherwise, the Court would be thrust into an uncertain
jurisprudence that would raise more questions than it would answer:
[A]n analogue test would launch courts on a difficult linedrawing expedition to determine which digital files are
comparable to physical records. Is an e-mail equivalent to
a letter? Is a voicemail equivalent to a phone message slip?
It is not clear how officers could make these kinds of
decisions before conducting a search, or how courts would
apply the proposed rule after the fact. An analogue test
would “keep defendants and judges guessing for years to
come.”64
[19] The Court may have recognized the difficulties that arose in the
years after Chimel, where the Court’s ad hoc jurisprudence was often
based on hyper-technicalities that resulted in a muddled, uncertain, and
unworkable jurisprudence. 65 Indeed, after Robinson, 66 Gant, 67 and New
York v. Belton, 68 law enforcement had nearly unfettered authority to
conduct warrantless searches incident to arrest, even where officer safety
63

Id. at 2491–92 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981)).

64

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (quoting Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
65

See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345–47 (2009).

66

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding a custodial arrest based
on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment and requires no
additional justification to conduct a search incident to arrest).
67

Gant, 556 U.S. at 342 (expanding Chimel to allow warrantless searches of vehicles
when the passenger is unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicle, and when
there is reason to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found within).
68

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981) (holding that upon arrest, law
enforcement may search a vehicle’s passenger compartment).
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and evidence preservation rationales were non-existent. Simply put, for
many years the warrant requirement ceased to exist the moment law
enforcement slapped handcuffs on a suspect.
C. Support for an Internet Neutrality Doctrine
[20] Although it is a Fourth Amendment case, the majority’s reasoning
in Riley reflects a fundamental truth: the world has changed, and to protect
basic civil liberties, the law must change as well. This is particularly true
with respect to the Internet, which is the digital age equivalent of
traditional public and limited purpose public forums (e.g., public
sidewalks and town halls), just as cellular telephones are similar to a
private home for search and seizure purposes.69 The Internet enables the
free flow of information between networks, including speech on matters of
political, social, and commercial importance. Importantly, however,
through pricing and “traffic shaping,” 70 which involves “slowing down
some forms of traffic, like file-sharing, while giving others priority,” 71
Internet service providers have the ability to discriminate against users
based on the content of their message, and thus thwart public debate and
stifle competition. These practices are the equivalent of allowing the Boy
Scouts to march in the public square, while relegating flag burners to
desolated areas, remote deserts, or dark alleys.72 Consequently, the Court
should embrace a net neutrality doctrine for the same reason it invalidated
warrantless cell phone searches in Riley: technology has ushered civil
liberties into the virtual world, and the law must adapt by providing legal
protections to individuals who speak, assemble, and associate in that
world.
69

See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(“A traditional public forum is property that by long tradition or by government that have
been devoted to assembly and debate”).
70

Christopher R. Steffe, Why We Need Net Neutrality Now Or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Start Trusting the FCC, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1149, 1158 (2010).
71

Id.

72

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a statute prohibiting
desecration of the American flag).
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D. The End of Metadata: Protecting Cell Phones as
Objects and Repositories for the Fourth Amendment’s
‘Papers and Effects’
[21] Riley establishes cell phones as the new repository for the “papers
and effects” that the Fourth Amendment protects from warrantless
searches.73 Not only did the Court reject the Government’s analogies to
pre-digital era physical objects, such as plastic containers, wallets, and
crumpled cigarette packs, but it also held that cell phone data, both in
quantity and quality, contains more private information than can be found
in a private home.74 To be sure, “[a] phone not only contains in digital
form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains
a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—
unless the phone is.”75
[22] In so holding, the Court implicitly recognized that cell phones, to
an even greater degree than private homes, engender privacy protections
as objects, and not merely because of the private data they contain. Thus,
just like law enforcement officers cannot enter a home to search for
incriminating evidence that might be in plain view inside the home, they
cannot search any area of a cell phone, even though some areas, such as a
call log, are less private than, for example, Internet browser history.76 The
point of Riley was that cell phones are protected not just for what they
contain, but for how they are used in modern society, and for the privacy
expectations that millions of individuals have in their phones. Thus,
73

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized”); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
74

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490–91.

75

Id. at 2491.

76

See id. at 2489.
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individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy not merely in a cell
phone’s contents, but in the phone itself.77 This could signal the end to
warrantless metadata collection, where the Government used cell phone
towers to monitor and collect information such as outgoing calls and
physical location. In fact, the Court suggested that this type of
information also warrants Fourth Amendment protection, “[d]ata on a cell
phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location
information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can
reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only
around town but also within a particular building.”78
[23] For purposes of metadata collection, the message is clear: the
Supreme Court is likely to hold that Government will not be permitted to
indiscriminately collect metadata unless it has, at the very least, reasonable
suspicion.79
E. The Third-Party Doctrine May be Invalidated
[24] The third-party doctrine is also a product of pre-digital era case
law, and holds that individuals who knowingly transmit information
through a third party can be found to have waived their expectation of
privacy in such information.80 Essentially, because individuals know that
a third party may or will view information that is transmitted via a cell
phone, they implicitly consent to its disclosure to additional parties. The
77

Id. at 2494–95 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a
cell phone seized incident to arrest is accordingly simply get a warrant.”).
78

Id. at 2490 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of
a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”)).
79

See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (establishing the reasonable suspicion
standard, which requires law enforcement, “to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion”).
80

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).
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problem with the third-party doctrine, however, is identical to the problem
the Government faced when trying to equate searches of physical
containers with searches of cell phone data. The third-party doctrine was
developed in an era when the information in question, e.g., a bank record
or paper check, did not implicate the same privacy concerns as are present
in the cell phone context. As one commentator notes, “the Supreme Court
decisions that established the third-party doctrine are decades old,”81 and
cell phones, just as they are not containers or address books, are unlike
“information voluntarily conveyed to banks in the ordinary course of
business.”82
F. Riley is Katz for the Digital Age
[25] To the extent that questions remain about the scope and
significance of Riley, they can be put to rest by reading three critical
passages in the majority opinion that show beyond doubt that Riley is Katz
for the digital age. Indeed, courts should not repeat the mistakes that
occurred in the post-Chimel era, where courts created an ad hoc, hypertechnical, and muddled jurisprudence that eviscerated Chimel’s limitations
and led to expansive searches regardless of concerns about officer safety
and evidence preservation. 83 In fact, Riley was the logical result of a
jurisprudence that had nearly abandoned the original Chimel justifications,
and this time the Court signaled that it will not make the same mistake
again.
81

Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of
Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 506 (2012).
82

Id. at 506–07 (discussing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976)).

83

See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342 (2009 ) (expanding Chimel to allow
warrantless searches of vehicles when the passenger is unsecured and within reaching a
distance of the vehicle, and when there is reason to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest may be found within); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981) (holding
that upon arrest, law enforcement may search a vehicle's passenger compartment); and
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding a custodial arrest based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment and requires no
additional justification to conduct a search incident to arrest).
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[26] First, by holding that there “are no comparable risks [to officer
safety and the destruction of evidence] when the search is of digital
data,” 84 the Court recognized that digital devices are so fundamentally
different from pre-digital era objects that they justified a categorical
prohibition against warrantless searches.85 Second, the Court stated in no
uncertain terms that cell phones contain a “broad array of private
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is,”86
and a case-by-case, Chimel-type jurisprudence would only threaten to
confuse, undermine, and render uncertain the core commitment to
protecting privacy. 87 Indeed, phones are not merely a compilation of
YouTube videos, Amazon.com purchases, and personal photographs.
They house users’ thoughts, private expressions, and most intimate and
confidential communications.88 Third, and in recognition of this fact, the
Court refused to fashion an “analogue test [that] would launch courts on a
difficult line-drawing expedition to determine which digital files are
comparable to physical records.” 89 Instead, the Court understood that,
although the Fourth Amendment remains unchanged from its original
purpose, the technology era has changed everything else. 90 With those
changes came a reaffirmation of that purpose and a commitment to protect
core civil liberties.
[27] Ultimately, the information on a cell phone is so private that the
only line to be drawn is precisely where the Court did: “[o]ur answer to
the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized
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Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
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See id. at 2493.
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Id. at 2490–91 (emphasis added).
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See id. at 2484–85.
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See id. at 2490.
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Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
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See id. at 2490–91.
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incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”91 Riley is the
new Katz, and soon the Government’s ability to track metadata, record
Internet browser history, apply the third-party doctrine to digital data, and
peer into other aspects of our private lives will end—just like pre-digital
era case law saw its relevance disappear in Riley.
IV. CONCLUSION
[28] Justice Brandeis forecasted that “[t]he progress of science
in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to
stop with wiretapping.” 92 In the law enforcement and government
surveillance context, technological advances have made it possible to store
an individual’s DNA in a national database, and have made it nearly
impossible for that same individual to send an e-mail, download a
YouTube video, or transmit a text message without knowing that the
government might be watching—without having the slightest degree of
suspicion of criminal behavior. In any society that values basic civil
liberties, such practices are intolerable—and unconstitutional. In Riley,
the Court correctly held that, if privacy is to mean anything, it should
protect individuals from being monitored without their consent, without a
reason, and without a warrant. It is the beginning of principled change
and enhanced protections for civil liberties in the digital age.
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Id. at 2495.

92

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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